A Spectre Haunting - New Dimensions Of Youth Protest In Western Europe by Mushaben, Joyce Marie & Center for International Studies UMSL
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
IRL @ UMSL 
UMSL Global 
1-1-1982 
A Spectre Haunting - New Dimensions Of Youth Protest In 
Western Europe 
Joyce Marie Mushaben 
mushaben@umsl.edu 
Center for International Studies UMSL 
Follow this and additional works at: https://irl.umsl.edu/cis 
 Part of the International and Area Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mushaben, Joyce Marie and Center for International Studies UMSL, "A Spectre Haunting - New 
Dimensions Of Youth Protest In Western Europe" (1982). UMSL Global. 11. 
https://irl.umsl.edu/cis/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in UMSL 
Global by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu. 
Occasional Papers 
Occasional PaJer No. 8208 
August, 1982 
The Center for International Studies 
of the University of Missouri-St. Louis 
issues Occasional Papers at irre u1ar 
intervals from ongoing research rejects, 
thereby providing a viable means for 
communicating tentative results. Such 
11 informal 11 publications reduces mewhat 
the delay between research and p blica-
tion, offering an opp.ortunity fo the 
investigator to obtain reactions wh i 1 e 
st i 11 engaged in the research. ommen ts 
on these papers, therefore, a.re art i c-
ul a rl y welcome~ Occasional Pae s sh·o1,1ld 
not be reproduced or quoted at 1 ngth 
withou~ the consent of the autho or of 
the Center for International Stu 1es. 
A SPECTRE HAUNTING: . 
NEW DIMENSIONS OF YOUTH PRO EST 
IN WESTERN EUROPE 
JOYCE MARIE MUSHABEN 

~--
-~L! _- ;. :·~ -
-~~ . 
, . . 
'" 
A SPECTRE HAUNTING: 
NEW DIMENSIONS OF YOUTH PROTEST 
IN WESTERN EUROPE 
Joyce Marie Mushaben 
· University of Missouri-St. Louis 
Prepared for delivery at the 1982 Annual Meeting of The American 
Political Science Association, The Denver Hilton Hotel, September 2-5, 1982. 
Copyright by the American Political Science Association. 
Abstract 
This paper rests on an introductory study involving the new dimensions and 
new strategies of European protest movements during the 1980's. The author fo-
cuses on the peace, anti-nuclear and ecology movements, the drive for autonomous 
youth centers, in s ... ,itzerland, racial disturbances in Britain and unrest among 
the urban squatters in the German Federal Republic. The analysis of specific so-
cial rebellions is limited to a treatment of six dimensions. The "substantive" 
dimensions include a) depoliticization; b) post11aterialism; and c) nationalism; 
the "strategic" dimensions are a) radicalization; b) decentralization; and c) 
institutionalization of protest. Protests of the eighties are found to differ 
from movements of the sixties in relation to the ever more violent nature of con-
frontations between the citizen and the state, and with regard to a growing con-
tingent of very young demonstrators, who have become a mobilizing force in their 
own right. The paper concludes that the willingness to engage in the process of 
system transformation is declining rapidly among protesters aged 15-24, at the 
same time it is growing among those old enough to have witnessed or participated 
in the movem~nts of the sixties. Both groups of protesters pose a significant 
cha11erce, if not an existentia1 threat, to the estab1ished po1itica1 parties in 
West European Systems. 
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'"' 
The more laws and restrictions. there are, 
The poorer people become. · · 
The sharper ~en's weapons, 
The more trouble in the land~ -
The more ingenious and clever men are, 
-The more.strange things happen. 
The more rules and·regulations, 
The more robbers and thieves. 
~~Tao t~ Ching, 600.B.C. 
A spectre of protest is haunting Europe, the likes of which have. not been vlit-
nessed in advance industrial societies since the late 1960 1 s. In regard _to.the latest 
wave of demonstrations in major European cities, one might be tempted to assume that 
many of the same activists, the old vanguard of the late sixties and early seventies, 
have reemerged from their ideological closets with the intention of mobilizing a _..suc-
cessor generation 11 of sympathizers around historical socjo-political controversies. 
Both the scale and the scope of protest movements which have so charg~d the European 
political climate in recent months nonetheless attest to the fact that the spirits 
behind the outbursts of social unrest from Amsterdam to Zurich bear little family 
resemblance to -those of earlier years. What is striking about these incidents of 
mass protest is that the·present-day participants constitute a very inotley crew,·in 
contrast to their more ideologically-pure predecessors. The activists of the eighties 
are rallying to form often bizarre coalitions around a complex of disparate issues 
and goals. They are moreover committed to a broad range of organizational tactics and 
sometimes even contradictory political strategies. 
. . 
· This paper undertakes an·introductory study concerning the new dimensions and 
new strategies.of political·protest in Western·Europe~ Based on field research con:-
ducted in Berlin, London and Zurich from May to July, 1982, ft· presents explanations 
which are admittedly exploratory in nature and conclusions which.are tentative &t 
best. In an effort to cultivate the Web~rian tradition of Verstehen as a research 
skill, this author chose an eclectic strategy: data have been derived on the basis 
of participant observation at demonstrations, walking tours· through affected ,neigh-
borhoods, and infonnal interviews with people inside and outside "the scene," to 
compl eme.nt her more orthodox documentation searches and media analyses. 
•, 
. The paper provides a broad overview of Eur_opean protest developments in an 
effort to .assess the degree of continuity that might exist between the dissident 
mqvements of the sixties, the seventies and the eighties. The 11 key issues'-' consider-
ed here include. the peace~, anti-nuclear and ecology movements, the drive for ciuton-
omous youth culture:centers, racial disturbances in Britain and the urban squat--
ters1 campaigns in the Federal Republic of Germany. The work begins by raising 
questions about the character of protest movements, 1980 1s-style, and their relation 
to democrati<: political systems. The analysis of specific social rebellions, found 
in Parts Two and Three, is limited to a treatment of six dimensions of protest, di-
vided into two categories .. :The 11 substantive11 dimensions <:onsidered include: a) 
the degree of (de)politicization or ideolog·ical orfentation; b) the emphasis on 
materialist versus 11 post-materialist11 values; _and c) trends toward nationalism __ 
and questions of political -identification. The se·corid category consists of: 11 tacti-
cal/strategic11 dimensions: a) 11 radicalization 11 versus less militant fonns oLpro-
test; b) the role of (de)centralization and consensus-building; and._ c) the 11 in-
sti tutiona 1 i za tion 11 of protest, the 1 ong-march ·strategy versus dropping-out. The 
final section of the ~aper considers the nature of the State's fesponse to protest, 
the linkages between conventional and-unconventional forms of participation and the 
metamorphosis of the democratic process in Western Europe. 
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I. INTERPRETING PROTEST, THEN ANO NOW 
There is, in fact, a thread of continuity running through the protests of ear-
lier years, both with respect to the movements' actual participants and with regard 
to the political "causes" activists have sought to represent. The peace demonstra-
tions of the 1980 1 s draw upon the traditions·of the Easter Marches and the Anti-
Nucl ear ~~eapons Campaigns of the 1950 1 s. The batt1 es over the creation of autono-
mou! youth centers in Switzerland date back to the fund-raisi~g efforts of the fif-
ties as we 11. sq·ua tters in Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Berlin can dra,..., upon the Wohn-
gemei nschaften experiences in communal living shared by students of the sixtieS:--
should the original model, the Paris Commun~ of the 1800 1 s, prove too remote. 
~ut a comparison of protest activi tes across,. three decades al so revea 1 s signif-
·i cant variations. The general thesis of this paper reads, that while there is an 
element of "something o1d .•• something borrowed 11 to be found in the latest wave of 
"demoslf -and campaigns, the resurgence of social unrest also involves "something 
new 11 and not necessarily cloaked in red, as was Marx's spectre of 1848. New to the 
protest scene is the expectat'ion that dissent increasingly leads to violent confron-
tations between citizens and the state. Also new is the realization that a growing 
contingent of alienated, non-university youth, aged 15-20, has become a mobilizing 
force in its own right. The addition of these two features poses qualitatively dif-
fer·ent problems for democratic theorists, pol icy-makers and preservers of .the estab-
lished public order. · 
Ronald· Inglehart~s 1971 analysis of "The Silent Revolution 11 in Western-Europe 
began with the premise that 11 individuals pursue .various goals in hierarchical _order 
-- giving maximum attention to the things they sense to be the most important un-
satisfied needs at a gtven time 11 (Inglehart, 1971, p~ 991). Intergenerational con-
flict is in some respects inevitable, to the extent that members of successive age. 
cohorts, socialized under different political-economic conditions, develop differ-
ent needs and are likely to retain a correspondingly different value hierarchy 
throughout adulthood. Po1itica1 values may undergo substantial modification, however, 
depending upon the interaction of cohort, life-cycle and period effects; -value modi-
fication, in turn, is subject to time lags, the length of which may also be a func-
tion of interactive effects (Inglehart, 1981, pp. 880-883). 
Intergenerational conflict has given rise to many a social rebelli~n in West-
ern nations, from the Young Hegelian Movement of the 1840's to the sexual revolu-
tion of the 1960 1 s. Protests mobilized by and confined to a specific cohort are 
likely to evince more internal homogeneity and commonality of purpose than those 
cutting across generational lines, the differentiating effects of class notwith.;. 
standing. Protest developments of the 1980 1 s almost defy efforts at systematic 
analysis; ideological and organizational patterns tend to be much more complex than 
those witnessed two cir three decades ago. Their comp1exity owes to the fact that, 
while the 11 causes 11 of protest find a traditional base in the generation gap between 
established politicians and newly enfranchised citizens, it is also true that pro-
.test developments in Western Europe are characterized by significant intergenera-
tional conflicts within and amona the dissident groups tbemselves. 
The response, therefore, to the fundair,.:nta1 question, 111hether there exists 
such~ thing as the.European protest movemert, is a resounding NO. As demcnstrated 
below, politicaldissidence is a many-headej, multi-tailed animal, nourished by 
numerous and conflicting groups, tactics arc! goals. Very significant differences . 
are observed in relation to the degree of ,1oliticization; commitment to a specific· 
ideological direction is more prevalent arr.ong the ·late forties to early fifties 
cohort than among those born after 1960. Among the latter, protest tends to be 
much more 11 existentialist11 in nature (Haller, 1981, pp. 202-203). Further variations 
are ri:anifest in the degree of radica1izat:on, that is, the proclivity toward ;;;ere 
via 1 ent forms of po 1 i ti cal action. 
' ' 
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This raises a second important question: do the European outbursts of social 
unrest have anYthing in -common? · What has· enabled these externally diverse and ·in-
ternally fragmented groups td. chalk-up many a successful mass mobilization campaign 
-- from the 21 French and German citizen groups,- who joined forces to resist plans 
for the Marckolsheim chemical plant on the-French side of the Rhine in 1972 (Nelkin 
and Pollack, 1981, p. 60); to the 1,50,000 Germans who flocked 11 to the biggest dem,-
onstration ever seen in Wiesbaden 11 in November, 1981 to oppose constructiQn of the 
Frankfurt runway Startbahn 18 West (Himmelheber, 1982, p. 6); to the 300,000 German, 
Dutch ·and 11 other" demonstrators who rallied for peace in Bonn on-·October 10; 1981 
(Deile, et al,_ 1981, p. 9ff)? Two ·elements permeate the movements. First, gerinane 
to all is the sense of radical_ opposition to fundamental premises and practices dom-
inating their respective political-economic·establishments. Secondly, the fusion of 
the dissident· movements is grounded, in common political learning experiences, posi-
tive and negative, which have subsequently_ been· adapted to suit ·other prote·st needs. 
Organizationally successful occupations o-f nuclear plant sites at Wyhl and -
Kaiseraugst, for example, have raised public consciousness, and have moreover re-
sulted in administrative court victories for -protesters (Nelkin and Pollack, pp. 61-
64; Aubert; 1982, p. 143). They have even contributed to discussions of.possible _ 
Pershing II and Cruise Missile site occupations in 1983 among mor~ militant, 
anti-armament facttons, according to i ntervie\'1S conducted by this author~ _ 
The integration and _adaptation of past learning experiences to new "struggle·" 
contexts poses a third question, namely, what is the longer-tenn significance of· 
protest in the .eighties, ·;n contrast to earlier movements? After 20+ years of· 
_ leftist-inspired activism the participants themselves are developing a sense of the 
evolutionary character of th_ese movements, which are def_inable in terms of 
..••. a social process that unfolds in a situational context. · Protest groups . 
- emerge as a result of structural changes in society and as a movement devel-
ops, its organization,-ideologies, and tactics adapt to the environmental· 
and political circumstances in which it evolves. In the course of broaden-
ing- its constituency and developing its strategies, a social movement also: 
becomes a source of further structu_ral change, though often in directions. 
:that may be neither anticipated nor intended (Nelkin and Pollack, p. 6). 
References to social evolution and. structural change ~ g_ do not provide 
complete -answers to a fourth important question, as _to why political malcontents 
of the eighties have resorted to ever more. violent forms of protest. _Violence and 
11 direct action 11 have become the rule rather than .the exception, especially among 
elements of .the squatters' arid culture-center scenes -- in other words, among those 
not yet of voting age. · More violent outbursts have in turn been accompanied by the 
"criminalization 11 of a ~ider range of nonconventional forms of participation by 
state officials. The proclivity toward violence can neither be simply_ interpreted· 
as an outflow of excess libidinal energy. among adolescents, nor glibly .. ascribed to 
failed ~xperiments in anti-authoritarian education.- Further, it is .not merely the 
product of poor police-community relations, as some have tried to argue in explain-· 
ing the Brixton •riots, for example (Scannan, .1981). One hypothesis worth exp1 ori rig 
is that the guerilla~warfare mentality now common to innercity unrest offers a.de~ 
layed confinnation of Marcuse's prognosis on the rise of 11 surplus repression 11 (Mar-
cuse, 1972, p. 52). ihe violence is sooner rooted.-in the complex.nature of press-
ing socio-economic problems; the spread of violence poses a threat ,ta the stability 
of th~ system and hence requires a spetifically political interpretation. 
Charles iilly's analysis on the role of collective violence in Western Euro-
p-ean: political development suggests the existence of a "standard cycle" that leads 
to a fusion of social protest and structural change. Historically, 
• a relatively integrated traditional society breaks up under the stress 
and movement of industrialization, the stress and movement stimulate a 
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wide variety of violent reactions -- at first chaotic, but gradual1y ac-
quiring a measure of coherence. New means of control and ways of rein-
tegrating the displaced segments of the population into an orderly social 
life eventually develop, and finally a mature industrial society held to-
gether by widespread, genera11y pacific political participation emerges • 
. In such a theory, the stimulus to co1lective violence comes largely from 
the anxieties people experience when established institutions fall apart 
(Tilly, 1979, p. 87). - . 
Perhaps the cycle repeats itself under the "stress and movement 11 of post-i ndus-
trial i zation. 
Violent forms of protest are r.ot merely the by~product of industrialization 
·an.d social displacement; rather, they derive from new struggles over established 
positions in the political structure of power. Tilly maintains that· 
Even presumably nonpolitical forms of co11ective violence ••. are normally 
directed against the authorities, accompanied by a critique of the au-
thorities' meeting of their responsibilities, and informed ·by a s.ense of 
jQstice denied to the participants in the process (Tilly, p. 87). 
As a direct challenge to authorities, ·violent protest may be seen to accompany and 
complement more organized, peaceful efforts by the aggrieved to reaiize their own 
political obj~ctives. Violent protest functions as a metering device with respect 
to perceived political legitimacy. · - · 
A -fifth question worthy.of consideration involves the special role of ado1es-
cent protest, a new class of "pro-anarchy/no future" citizens, whose first direct 
contact.with the state is mpre likely to have been a burst of tear-gas rather than 
a trip to the ballot box. Youth in the postwar period has become a powerful meta-
phor for social change, the personification of new life-styles and values -- which 
consequently poses another direct challenge to the existing authority structure. 
But the position of youth in post-industria1 society arid its prospects for self-
actualization have also under:-gone a radical transformation. In a study of post 
World Wai II youth subcultures, British sociblogists h~ve noted that 
in the 1950 1 s, •youth' came to symbolise the most advanced point of social 
change· .•• youth was the vanguard party ... soci a 1 change was seen as gen-
erally beneficial ('you've never-had it so good') ••• in the early 1960 1 s, -
the most visible and identifiable youth groups were involved in dramatic 
events which triggered off 'moral panics', focusing, ·in displaced fonn, 
society'_s 'quarrel with itself' .• ·• Ir. this crisis of authority, youth now 
played the role of symptom and scaoeaoat (-Hall and Jefferson, 1982, pp. 
71 ~72). 
The late 1960 1 s gave way to counter-cu1ture, student protest and street poli- -
tics; you,th lost its reputation as a positive agent for change and acquired the 
image of a subversive minority, which the Law and Order Society sought to control. 
Economic recession, educational reforms gone haywire and rising unerr:ployment figures 
in the 1970's and 1980 1 s have since ascribed to youth a much more static role --
as a case for sccial workers and psychotherapists (Oltmann, 1980, pp. 40-45; 
Giesecke, 1981, p. 6)~ Alienated, unemployed adolescents moreover serve as living 
proof that politicians have failed to meet their social responsibilitiesj i.e. by 
not fulfilling their electora1 promises- of equal opportunity and sustained economic 
grm>1th (Frackmann, et_tl., 1981, pp. 7-_9). 
Last but not least, an overvie,,., _of ~est Europe2.n Social movements rriust also 
inquire as to the 11 meaning" of protest for the: political system cs a whole. This 
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raises questions regarding the effects of protest on the understanding of democ-
. racy in specific national contexts. It further questions the long term prospects 
for _{ re)integrating individual activists into the estab1 ished political ins ti tu- . 
tions. Political socialization research points to party identification as the area . 
in which early'.'."instill~d political preferences are most likely to persist {Ingleharts 
1971, p. 992). The proliferation of "alternative" parties, combined with a strong 
anti-politics orientation among the youngest generation of protesters may indeed 
become an important source o_f stru_ctural change. 
IL THE SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSIONS: WHO'S PROTESTING WHATi 
. A major survey sponsored by the German Shell Corporation confirmed that "Youth 
· '81" evinces 1 i ttl e of the dynamism, optimism or the care-freeness one would_ expect 
of those to whom "the future 11 allegedly belongs. Of· the 1075 15-24 year olds in-
terviewed, 95 percent do not believe that wars will. one day cease to plague the 
human race; nor do 95 percent believe that it is.possible tq create a secure, worry-
free s~ciety~ ·At least 80 percent anticipate a future of scarce resources, economic 
crises and famines; 78 percent hold human equality for an unatta-inable goal; 76 per-
cent· presume that chemistry and technology will indeed destroy the environment 
{Jugendwerk, 1981, p. 384). If the prospects are really so grims then there is a 
m~asure of political realism in youth's depiction of itself as the No Future Genera-
tion. Hence, the young peop.le's claim that "we want everything and indeed subito" 
(Giesecke, 1981). 
· A. Dimens1on 11Depol iticfzation" and the Drive ror Autonomous Youth Centers (AJZ) 
In contrast to the· anti-imperialis:t, ariti-Vietnam campaigns of the l960's, 
movements of -.the 1980' s are unique in their c9mbination of "traditional II protest 
activities {demonstrations) with a multitude of concrete, pragmatic efforts to de-
velop new work-and~life-styles .. {Giesecke, p. 4). The domi.nant theme is "No Power 
tQ .. No One.II Activists•· negative orientation _to politics, fused with a preference 
. for bizarre, counterctiltural behavior underlines the importance of problems and 
-contradictions for which money provides no solution. This refocusing on values 
·(human closeness, individual free<lom) becomes a source of great discomfort to es-
tablished.powers conmitted to efficiency and ·technocratic expertise.·· Their lan-
·. guage is decidedly anti-ideological, ant-i-intel lectual -- 1.ec delights in gram-
matica11y incorrect wordplay -- and even the -New Socialization Type: Student is 
consciously inimi ca 1 to II theory. 11 · · 
.The anti-politics orientation derives from a recognition that gaps between 
theory and practice are. the rule rather than the exception. Criticism is not di-
rected against the abstract values of a majoritarian·society {freedom, social jus-
tice); protesters question instead whether it is possible for Big Politics to de-
velop a clear orientation to these values. Secondly., the apolitical behavior of . 
the younger generation st~s from experience; the under-aged are powerless in their 
efforts to exercise political influence through normal channels.· Thirdly, not only 
the content of politics, but also the manner in-which politicians and administra-
tors dea-1 .with citizens is perceived as destructive to the individual •. Fourth, the 
web of bureaucratic rules and regulations concentrates more on the security of the 
state than on the protection of citizens; final decisions are more sensitive to 
jurid.ic_al imperatives than to individual needs. Fifth, the image of future society 
is one based on a single set of values; crlteria and behaviors, brought into harmony 
with technological development. The majority culture denies minority and alterna-
tive cultures the right to exist. - Protesters reject the notion that alternative 
·. valu.es may apply in the personal sphere a_s long as majoritarian standards prevail · 
· in the productive.sector. Further," the commitment to large-scale political organiz,., 
atians has resulted in a "leveling" of social problems and a 11monotonizing 11 of 
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culture. Moreover, the special problems of youth~- the need for more humane 
schools _and better vocational training, high youth unemployment anp the shortage 
of affordable, decent housing -- have been exploited for electoral purposes, but 
subsequently ignored by office-holders. Finally, younger people feel ·that they have 
been denied a chance to organize themselves and to learn from their own mistakes • 
. "Youth pol icy" has been conducted for, but not in comnunication with those most 
.. affected (Giesecke, 1981). - · · -
, . ' 
The struggles involved in the efforts to create autonomous youth centers (AJZ) 
in Switzerland and Germany (which can only be summarized here) lend an empirical 
base to these criticism. The AJZ activists express a commitment to principles of 
self-responsibility and grass-roots democracy; they militate against the coldness 
of established,· subsidized culture •. "Pack Ice" and "Concrete" images symbolize the 
sterility and lack of individual wannth of the dominant culture •. Leitmotif: "Too 
bad concrete doesn•t burn." 
The drive to establish special centers in Switzerland began with· the fonna-
tion of the Initiative Conunittee for a Zurich Youth House in 1949. Various fund 
raising activities were instigated by adolescent groups through the fifties and 
netted a center fund of Fr. 800,000 by 1960, while city fathers argued over a pos-
·. sible site. In 1968, the younger generation took_ to the streets several ,times to 
express its' impatience; the June Anti-Pol ice and Globus demonstrations resulted 
in violent physical confrontations. Attempts to "occupy11 buildings were unsuccess-
ful, until the City Council agreed in 1977 to provisional centers in the Rote Fabrik 
and Schindlergut, both in need of substantial renovation. Large scale protests 
.· oc,curred frequent1y over the next three years, culminating in a demonstration of 
8,000 on June 21, 1980. Shortly thereafter, officials announced a decision to pro-
vide· a credit of 60 mill ion Franken for renovation of the Zurich 0,pera House. On 
June• 28, politicians consented to an Autonomous Youth Center in the l immatstrasse, 
to the. tune of Fr. 40,000. · Unrest continued throughout the sunvner, spreading to 
Bern·anq Basel. A September 4 police raid on the·center,led, to a ·find of 230 grams 
of hashish, a quantity of "powder resembling heroin," 2 pistols and an air gun, 
resulting in the immediate closing of the AJZ. On September 8, the local council 
:approved a Fr. 170,000 expendittire for a new high-pressure waterhose. In November, 
• . an· EidgenBssische Kormnission published its Theses on the Causes of Youth Unrest, 
openly denounced by Zurich's Educational Superintendent, Alfred G1 lgen. (Rowald, 
1981, p. 133). By January, 1981, 1400 demonstrators were subjected to criminal in-
vestigation. The AJZ was reopened in April, 1981, under the sponsorship of the 
Social Democratic Party and a church-related group, Pro Juvente, with a subsidy of 
one million Franken; it closed again a few months later owing to drug traffic. On 
March 23, 1981, the building in the Limmatstrasse was demolished; the site remains 
empty -- all physica·l reminders that politicians failed to deal effectively with 
youth problems in Zurich have literally been eliminated. 
Confrontations at the Youth Center Komm in Nuremberg may have been less pro-
lo,nged, but the results. have been no lessdepressing for urban adolescents. What 
Zurich youth sought for decades to acquire had come into being some eight years 
ago, .under the auspices of a relatively progressive SPD Cultural Director, Hermann 
.Glaser. The Communication Center, not far from McDonald's, had an annual budget of 
DM 600,000, of which OM 210,000 was spent on four full-time secretaries, programs 
and advertising. For the CSU Opposition in City Hall, Komm served.as an "Agitation 
Center" and a "switchboard for rabblerousersl' (Aust, 1981, p. 67). Korran visitors 
were known to arrange discussions on drug-and-squatter-related problems, and many 
no doubt had personal connections to "the scene~" 
In February, 1981, Bavarfan CSU Minister President Franz Josef Strau_ss advised 
. his Interior Minister Tandler to adopt a· hard line against youth unrest, in 1 ight 
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of "the serious transgressions of the rioting, brutal chaotics in Berl in, Frankfurt, 
G8tti ngen and Hamburg 11 (Aust, p. 6'2). It became standard procedure by March 
to station several pol ice units around the Center every time a special event was 
scheduled. On Friday, March 5, in spite of a cityfathers 1 Verbot, two Dutch guests 
showed a film deal in~ with squatter developments in Amsterdam, to which the police 
sent a number of V-Manner (from the Constitutional_ Protection Office) to record the 
discussion on the tactical use of for'ce. A spontaneous disturbance involving about 
150-200 exiting.youngsters broke out after 25 vans of police attempted to block off 
surrounding streets; the majority then sought asylum back in Ko~m. At 3:30 a.m. 164 
occupants were taken· into police custody, against 141 of whom identical.criminal · 
charges were filed. Many were transported to detention centers in Bayret1th or Munich, 
their parents first informed after the weekend (DIE ZEIT, 11. December 1981). Re-
ports indicate that at least 70 adolescents were known to ·have been drinking tea, 
playing chess or listening tb music ai the time of arrest (Aust, p. 72). The first 
trial proce~dings in November, 1981,/wer_e postponed when important evidentiary police 
trans·cripts·suddenly 11 disappeared 11 (DIE ZEIT, 2. Aprir 1981). Due to controversy_over 
"legal irregularities•• in the select~on of judges, a substantial number hadyet to 
be tried by 1 ate spring of 1982. I · 
If established politician Franz/ Joseph Strauss sees fit to summ~rize his re-
action to youth disturba_nces with th,e phrase, "Democratization is the beginning of 
anarchy" (Howald, p.193); when the President of the Zurich tity Council announces 
to _thousands gathered in front of c;:ty Hall, 11 00 not take it for granted that w_e · 
have to comS= out here" to discuss th~ demonstrators• demands, it comes as no sur-
p~ise that they sh~uld lose fafth in/ the political process. 
The 11 depoliticization 11 of youthi protest.has two components. _The first involves 
disinterest in the established politjical system, which is expected to prevail among 
the youngest; _as part of the life-cyjcle effect. A 1977 Shell study shows this to be 
especially true in Germany (Table I). 
- Table I: Expresse1d I_nterest in Politics (In Percent) - · 
Question: How sttjong is your interest i~ politics? 
! 
Age Very I Somewhat Hardly - - No tlo 
Group Country Strong Strong interested 
I 
ir.teresteQ interest Response 
I 
Total Germany 3 9 /35 26 26 l 
- Sample Britain· 2 5 123 17 50 3 
France 3 10 !30 . 11 46 l 
, 12-13 FRG l 2 24 29 41 2 
years GB 0 l 14 17 62 7 
Fr. - 2 2 16 11 68 2 
17-18 FRG 4 13 -134 26 23 1 
years GB 2 8 126 18 43 2 
Fr. 3 10 36 12 39 0 
I 
., 
Number ,,., 
100 1006. 
100 904 
100 940 
10.0 333 
100 308 
100 332 
100 332 
100 - •307 
100 342 
22-23 FRG 4 13 46 -- 24 13 0 - - 100 341 
years GB - 3 6 30 17 · 43 . 1 100 289 
.Fr. 3 20 fO 12 26 0 -·.-100 266 
Source: Jugendwerk d~r Deutschen ~hen, Hrsg. JUGam Ill. EUROPAIHRE EINGLEIDERUr,G 
HI DIE HELT DER ERWACHSENH), Band I1I, Hamburg: JDS, !977. p. 77. _. - . - - _ _ 
The second component involve~ an ac~i ve distrust, manifested ,n· an unwi 11 i ngn·ess to 
join political organizations /of anyl sort; distrust is more likely to be a ~unction 
of negative experiences, now: being made by ever younger members of the· pol, ty. _ As 
Table II indicates, these early expbriences may counteract_ family-instilled politi-
cal preferences and, consequently, kliminate the rationale for party identification 
Age 
.. roup Country 
· Totai FRG 
Sample GB 
Fr. 
12··]3 FRG 
years GB 
Fr. 
17-18 FRG 
years GB 
Fr. 
22-23 FRG 
.years r.a 
Fr. 
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Table II: Party Participation (!n Percent) 
Question: Would ycJ like to become a member 
of a political party? 
Most Probably Very t:o 
Certainly Possibly not improbable response 
3 20 32 44 0 
2 7 26 56 10 
6 13 ·11 58 13 
3 16 31 so 1 
1 4 23 53 20 
3 9 6 53 30 
3 22 33 42 0 
4 9 27 55 5 
8 15 13 59 4 
5 21 33 41 0 
3 8 2£ 59 3 
6 15 14 62 3 
., ,. 
100 
100 
100 
100 
l('IQ, 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Source: Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, Hrsg. JUGE~D IN EUROPA, -Band II, 
pp. 77. 
II 
Number 
1M6 
904 
940-
333 
308 
332 
322 
207 
342 
3i, 1 
2B9 
266 
1977. 
among the young. The Institut fur Oemoskopie in Allensbach has reported that of 5.4 
;nillion.German 17-23 year olds, 700,000 are dropouts, 2.7 miliion are disillusioned 
with domestic condftions and 1.13 million (21 percent) have no intention of voting 
(STERN, Nr. 38/1979). There is something much more fundamental than 11 the end of 
ideology 11 at stake, and the spray-painted anarchy symbol has appeared in a11 major 
European cities. Is this an era of 11 No Pol itics 11 for a 11 No Future" generation? 
8. Cimer:sior: "Post-~·~ateria1ism 11 and the Pursuit of Happiness Among the. Squatters 
An active distrust of politics is a trait.shared by AJZ protesters and members 
of the Hausbesetzer scene. The squatters differ from center supporters in that 
their search for solidarity extends beyond weekends and recreational periods. Given 
the hours invested in squatter-council discussions, physical repair,mrk and constant 
efforts to avoid forceful eviction by police, the occupation of houses becomes "a 
real full-time job" .;:._ with overtime (Aust, p. 11). 
The idea is to live better with less, to arrange satisfying work-and-living 
conditions, rather than to overcompensate one's 11 Frust11 through consumptio~. Col-
lective action becomes a key weapon against social isolation. The question is 
whether the 15-24 year olds really have a choice regarding the idea of "living with 
less. 11 They feel marginalized by their Not-Yet-Status, see few prospects for becom-
ing affluent adu1ts. Their only positive role is Youth-as-Consumer. In the Federal 
Republic, the 12-21 year olds reportedly have a purchasing potential of OM 18 bil-
lion per month -- those 1 ucky enough to have jobs ( 01 tmanns, 1981, p. 25) .. 
Youth unemployment has reached catastrophic proportions in Great Britain, 
where it is estimated that one half of all school-leavers in 1982 will be without 
jcbs, and that less than 50 percent of thbse 16-17 year olds eligible for the new 
Youth Training Scheme in 1983 wi1i ffod permanent positions (House of ComIT1ons, 1982, 
p. 22). The picture is not nearly so grim in Switzerland, where jab market pressures 
have been relieved at least temporarily by the decision to send home one million 
guestworkers in the mid-1970 1 s. S1-Jiss youth may fa.ce .a waiting pericd up to two 
years for highly desired apprenticesh1ps; but they are available. The German sta-
tistics on youth unemp_loyment fall in bet\'l'een, though the outlook is far from 
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Table III. Unemployed Youth. Ages·1s-20 and 20-25, in 
the Federal. Republic of Germany. 
Year/Month 15-20 20-25 Percent General 
Nur.:ber Percent Number Percent · Unemel oyment 
• September 1967 19,212 0.8 - 24,322 · 1.0 1.6 
September 1970 7,522 0.4 - 10,653 0.4 b.4 
September 1973 20,960 1.1 30,041 1.1 1.0 
September 1975 115,753 6.2 .171,620 6.5 4.4 
September- 1977 105,900 s.r 161,?73 6.2 4.0 
September 1978 92,030 .4.4 153,93~ 5.a .3~8 
September 1979 · 68,593 3.1 123, 709· - 4.5 ,3.2 
September 1980 81,055 3.5. 143,526 - 3~5 
Source: Margrit Frackmarin, et al. NULL BOCK -o□ER MUT ZUR ZUKUNFT? JUGENDLICHE 
IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK, Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 1981. p. 154 . . 
encouraging~ as Table III illustrates. Though Gennan rates are not high in in-. 
ternational comparison, historical experiences with unemployment and inflation add 
weight to the problem -(Scharpf et al., 1982). - -. 
- -.--- . -
. ,. ,• 
The number of Gennans aged -15-30 increased between·1975 and 1980 from 1.7 mil:.. 
lion to 13.8 million; by 1985 this age group_of potential job-hunters will add 
another 1. 7 mil lion.· Official unemployment figures among those under twenty reached 
90,000 in the surrmer of 1981; an estimated.200,000 have notyet found suitable ap-
prenticeships (Frackmann, 1981, p. 33, p. 42). Among the children of foreign work-. 
ers, onJy 40,000 of the 160,000 15-19· year olds are completing vocational training 
(Frackmann, p •. 68) •. The alternatives may be fatal. Reimar Oltmanns reports that 
over 150,000 young Germans have joined religious cults; 80,000 are known to be nar-
cotics addicts, with-the wor1d's Number One heroin-death rate of 600·annually; 
180,000 still in.school regularly consume alcohol; 300,000 have juveni.le criminal 
records; some 3 mi11ion suffer serious psychological problems; and by 1979, the num-
ber of suicides in the 15-25 group topped 1500 annually (Oltmanns, pp. 40-43). 
·Another alternative, communal living experiments based on the illegal ·occup~~ 
tion of vacant buildings, has attracted political attention because of the violence 
generally asso~iated ~lith the evictions. Despite their image as storm-trouping an-
archists, the squatters actually co~prise~at least four distinct groups: 1) the 
urban-political elements, cultivating cooperative efforts among city planners, ar-
chitects_, social workers and tenant organizations (Mieterinitiativen); 2) self-pro-
claimed.supporters .of the Punk, 11 Sponti 11 and Anarcho-Scenes; 3) individuals attracted 
out of 11 existential necessity", including l509-3000 drug addicts, .runaways and home-
less; 4) political trend-followers and sympathizers, students,. apprentices and :in-
tellectual part~timers (Giesecke, p. 17}. 
The illegal take-overs and make-overs by young activists are justified on the 
basis of genuine shortages of affordable, 11 livable 11 housing in major urban centers. 
Protest against planned obsolescense and land speculation on the part of owners and 
developers also p1ays_ a role. In Frankfurt (known to the scene as Bankfurt or Krank-
furt); 1000 luxury apartments stand empty, while 20,500 people are registered as · 
"homeless" (Haller, 1981, p. 77). In Zurich, where the occupations have a more lim-
ited, symbolic function, a one room apartment easily corr:mands a monthly rent of 
Fr. 1000-2000, circa $500-$1000 (Ho~ald, ~- 154). 
The Amsterdam Kraakers (the sound of a bolted ~oar being opened~ith an iron 
wedge) have served as a role model for would-be squatters across the continent. As 
earlyas 1971, the Dutch HighCourt guaranteed already settled activists a legal 
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"right to peaceful occupancy, 11 making prevention of take-overs the main focus of 
police activity. Over 10,000 apartments have been occupied in 10 years by 30,000 
people; over 60,000 "hardship cases" continue to search for suitable dwellings. 
The squatters tend to enjoy widespread support,.despite the shockwaves produced by 
violence during the· investiture of Queen Beatrix in April, 1981 (CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, May 2, 1981). The Kraakers c1aim to have learned valuable organizational 
lessons during the "Brokdcrf-conditioning" days; that Dutch squatters also partici-
pate in anti-nuclear energy demonstra_tions "can be taken for granted" (Ha11er, p. 
131). 
West Berlin, Nikolas Ritter argues, 11 has a good ch.a.nee of becoming the Drop-
Out City of Western Europe: (DER SPIEGEL, Nr. 11/1979). That Berlin has more 
Hausbesetzungen than any other German Land is due to the fact that the housing 
shortage is a1so more extreme (TAGESSPIEGEL, 31. July 1982). A major construction 
scandal that forced Major Dietrich Stobbe 1 s resignation in 1980 only underlined 
squatters 1 cynicism regarding SPD promises to remedy the problem. Interim Reigning 
Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel was relatively successful in reestablishing local peace on 
the basis of his 11 Berlin Line" policy. Building owners were requ.ired to provide 
concrete proof and irmiinent dates of renovation plans before evictions would be 
undertaken. The Berlin government meanwhile attempted to arrange for 11 property-use 
contracts" between fodividual households and landlords. Popular sympathy initial_ly 
fested with the squatters, especially in neighborhoods where urban renewal was long 
overdue and the trade union controlled developing company Neue Heimat was engaging· 
in legally questionable tactics (Schindele, 1980). Despite Vogel 1 s short-term suc-
cess, the saliency of the housing catastrophe and the list of policy failures in 
other a~eas was too long to prevent the SPOls def~at in the 1981 special elections. 
This city of L9 mjllion inhabitants was found tb have over 800 empty apart-
ment buildings in various stages of decay by the late seventies, along wi'th 1500-·· 
2000 individuals without leases and 40,000 register~d as "urgently ~n need" of 
housing (Haller, p. 105). In the Kreuzberg neighborhood alone, of the 16,000 rental 
units requiring major repairs in 1963, 2,400 had been torn dm•m, 1400 n2v.1~1 ccn-
structed and 14 renovated by 1973 (Aust, p. 30). According to official statistics, 
248 buildings have been occup·ied since 1979; 727 persons are .11 registered squatters 11 
in 30-40 core houses (TAGESSPIEGEL, 9. July 1982). The new CDU Mayor Richard van" 
WeizsMcker promised to uphold the 11 Berlin Line, 11 after assuming office in May, 1981. 
Nevertheless, the number of forceful evictions has increased dramatically over the 
last year, and the remainder are subject to frequent 11 searches 11 by the po1ice. As 
of August, 1982, the number of besetzte H~user stdod at 123. Since 1979, pol{ce have 
11 investigated 11 1600 persons and initiated 5791 court proceedings in conjunction with 
eviction-related street battles (TAGESSPIEGEL, 9. Ju1y 1982). · 
Conditions in the occupied buildings are genera11y quite primitive; many lack 
windows and doors, most lack showers; private toilets and depend on coal ovens for 
heat. More important for these urban protesters, however, is the chance to create 
their own space and develop their own life-styles. The 11 period effects 11 of a declin-
ing economy are likely to have a much stronger impact on the value preferences of 
yolng squatters than on well-housed adults, owing t~ t~eir greater economic vulner-
ability. 
fi. high lei/el of perceived physical irsecurity could, in theory, lead to a re-· 
ne\·1ed intc:rc:st in r::att::rialist values. In fact, InglEhart h3.s alreo.dy registered a 
decl 1ne in the ratio of Post-Matcriu1ists to Mat8rial ists in the youngest group 
surve/ed beb'leen -1973 and 1976 (Inglehart, 1981, p. 888). The shift a111ay from Post-. 
Naterialisiu,· hc~cver) cannot be interpreted as a ~ain for the Materialist camp. 
Insiler:2tt 2.~ i.:es th~,t i:,scc 1 •• 17"ity has r2ce:1tly arrested the.spre.:d of Post-'.(2teri-. 
a1isir,, l~adi g t~J 2. r:::ncv!ed t~::~;:h~i:::is on rc~industrieli:c1tio:: and rea.r~arr:ent. H~ fails 
:J ~~~~~~n t ai 'tis th2 01~2~, est3blished gencr~ticn that is 2gain supp~rting 
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these goals at the policy-making- level. As the 1981 Shell survey demonstrates, - there 
is still a high degree.of commitment to environmental protection, greater individual 
freedom, support for women's rights and the peace movement among youth~ This sug.,.. 
gests that there are perhaps two classes of Post-Materialists: those aged 25-34 who 
have "made it,'-' are now established in careers and can devote their energies to po-
litical causes; and those who are under_25 who are r~signed to not attaining satis-
fying. professions and expensive possessions, who have opted for a more extr.eme· set 
of anti-materialistic values. Could this be the geheration of Post-Post-Materialists? 
C. _Dimension "Nationalism" and the Advent of European Racism 
~ - . . . 
- Throughout the sixties; the repression of blacks _in the United States was a 
common topic and stimulus to 11 anti-Americanist11 sentiments among elements of the 
_ European Left. Students as-well as tra9e unionists ·also stood more or' less united 
in their opposition to_ exploitation of Third World workers by the multinational car..: 
poratfons. The influx-of foreign student~ at European universities, along wiih the 
importation of _guestworkers in the mid-sixties, was co_nstrued_ as a fonn of develop-
ment assistance, which, of course, conveniently served domestic economic n~eds._ The 
physical presence of these foreigners undeniably raised consciousness w_ith respect 
to the plight of the Third World. The llguests 11 appear to hav_e worn out their wel-_ 
come~ In light of. serious economic crises in the developed counties, the continued 
presence of Asians, Africans and Turkish nation~1$ has ~reduced psychological as 
well as complex socio-economic problems for the host nations. · 
The p_roblem of racism is intimately connected to the resurgence of right-wing 
groups.and nee-nationalism. Surprisingly, however, ulta rightist, racist tendencies 
are finding expression among different age groups in Great Britain and in the Fed-
eral Republic. In both cases, though,. economic: insecurity seems to lie at the base. 
Non"."'nationals are increasingly viewed as illegitimate competitors in the struggle 
for ·access· to scarce housing and job opportunities. -
Great Britain, the textbook case of a democratic, albeit ltdeferential society," 
experienCed major outbursts· in nine cities during July of 1981, and additional un-
rest in Toxteth/Liverpool iri July, 1982. The disturbances were triggered by race-
related incidents. Having stalwartly shouldered "the white man's burden" through -
the nineteenth century, Britain has proved unprepared to conquer the problems posed 
by th,e influx of New Commonwealth citizens in the mid-twentieth century. Unlike the 
guestworkers-in Germany on temporary visas, the Afro-Caribbean and Asian residents 
cannot be sent home, many of the youngest constituting the third. generation. Little 
attention was paid to integration schemes through the fifties and sixties. Since 
1968, ·the focus has been on legislative devices geared to restricting future immigra-
tion -- in a country where it ,s "still respectable in the House of Commons'' to de-
scribe ethnic minorities as "aliens" and 11 aenetica1ly different" (Behrens,' 1982, 
p. 126). Since the seventies; attention has turned to Law and Order Legislation, 
i.e. the 11 sus 11 law, in.effect affording police and-the courts much discretion in. 
respond,ng to delinquency among young· blacks (Husband, 1982, ·pp. 304-305; Hall and 
Jefferson, pp. 73-74). 
The Southall demonstration of April 23-24, 1979, i.n the public's eye;-is clas-
sified ·as ·an incident distir.ct from confrontations between ethnic groups and police 
through the summer of 1981. In this case, sympathy fell to the Asian community in 
its reaction to unprovoked acts of white racism. A variety cf Asian-Indian, commu-
nity and youth groups planned a peaceful sitdown before the_ Town Hall to protest 
an election meeting of the ul tra'."'right National Front Party there. The aggressive 
behavior. of the police toward those intent on a "march for unity and peace" dealt 
a severe shock to the comr:unity as a i,i1hole, ~1hich was relatively well-int~grated 
(Dummett, 1980, pp. 7-15). 
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The National Front Party, formed in 1967, pursued a political program centered 
on 11 racial purity" and other values repugnant to British democracy. Up until 1979 5 
the NF neverthe 1 ess adhered to demo era tic ru1 es and procedures (Husband, p. 261). 
The 1979 elections were. proc1aimed to be 11 a supreme test". of right-wing strength. 
The resu1ts weredisasterous, 1.6 percent for the NF, even outdistanced by th1: new 
Ecc 1 ogy Party (Taylor in NEW COMMUNITY, No.· 2, Autumn, 1981). The NF then abandoned 
its democratic tactics in favor of physical attacks on the Asian community, so se-
vere that the Home Office felt obliged to commission a special investigation .(Home 
Office, 1981). 
These developments created a framework of tension for the Srixton 'disorders of 
April 10-12, 1981. The riots were set off when police attempted to assist a joung 
black whom they thought had been stabbed. As crowds began to gather, rumors spread. 
that the police had inflicted the injury. Over two days of rioting, burning and 
looting, 7,4t2 police were brought into a community genera11y serviced by 710 (NEW 
SOCIETY, 3. December 1981). The nation breathed a s·igh of relief when the publica-
tion of Lord Scarman I s Report in November provided an Offi ci a 1 Answer to the causes 
of unrest. This report, which focused on event~ in only one of four wards, sa~ the 
main problem in poor communication between the police and the black community; the 
fact that white youths sided with the blacks in three other wards and uptown lcot-
ing·was overlooked (Interview with MP John Tilley, former Shadow Minister of Race 
Relations). Other factors .. general unemployment in Brixton which stood at.13 percent, 
fer blacks under 19 at 55 percent and homelessness among 200=300 blacks, were men- · 
tioned as "background" (Scarman, 1981, pp. 25-27). Lord Scarman regretted the re- · 
sults of "delay and lack of vigour," 11 unimaginative and inflexible policing 11 (Scar-
man, pp. 100-101). He concluded: 111 Institutional racism• does not exist in Britain: 
but racial disadvantage and its nasty associate, racial discrimination, have not 
yet been eliminated" (Scarman, p. 209_1. · 
Racist senti;-;-;ents and attraction to ultra-right~ neo-nazi groups are a 1ong-
standing tradition -among white wor'.dng c1ass youths in t"'.e '~K. :he "Teddy !3o'ys'' 
were the recognized instigators of the 1958 Nottingham face-riots (Hall and Jeffer-
son, p. 83). The "skin-heads 11 of the late sixties emerged from the rapidly worsen-
ing economic situation among the lo.wer working class stratum. The intensified feel-
ing of Us-Them led to a search for solidarity,along 11 territorial 11 lines. These self-
proclaim_edllMobs11 cultivated a collective, macho identity, for which footba11 and 
the particu1ar brand of violence associated with mass sporting events provided an 
arena for expression (Ha11 and Jefferson, p. 101). Their own sports, 11 Paki-8ashing 11 
.and 11 Queer-Bashing, 11 entailed ritualized attacks on the corrmunity 1 s most obvious 
scapegoats and gained in popularity following the NF's electoral fiasco of 1979. 
Officials generally feared renewed white outbursts as the youth unemployment pie-. 
ture continued .to darken. · 
In 1979 a split occurred among the ultra rightists~ the 30-40 year olds continu..,. 
inf their support of the National Front as a non-constitutional movement with a 
strong pro-police orientation. The younger elements gravitated to the British Move-
ment, which has adopted a more anti-police stance-and has acquired functions akin 
to a 11 Youth Club. 11 The NF has not dared to make waves in Brixton since 1978 (In-
terview with MP Ti11ey). Right-wing potential nonetheless remains anchored in the 
younger 11 1 umpenpro 1 etari at. 11 
-Renewed efforts to organize ar.:ong .right-i•dng extremists in the Federal Repub-
lic are also characterized by a growing animosity toward foreigners 
(Ausl;nderfeindlichkeft), especially toward Turkish nationals. The Shell survey 
nonetheless holds that only one percent of the.15-24 year olds identify with and 3 
percent find the nee-nationalistic grot,Jps 11 very good, 11 while 33 percent of the 
sample are prepared. to "struggle against 11 and 41 percent 11 dislike 11 these g-r-cups 
( ·ua-r.a'•.,ey, 1K 1 081 - i 7 ) .,.,n"Se ,,,hr, do ir'-rit·;.: .. --r,o .:y,r,r-, ic· ·~·r <;I"'-~" OC""""-.;C ,w ,.;i;:. •,1 •. ', •• , !---'• _, 1 • l \.' _ ·, !~ , ... c::., , ::J i._i..,•,i . ._ : , ~.,: • ·~c: .,,v\- iv-._ u1,1....,-!J,: 
-13-
- . 
backgrounds. A .1979-Bl Berlin survey of 1_60,000. school children found 60: eighth to 
tenth graders clas_sified_ as ultra-right (TAGESSPIEGEL, 10. July 1982). Given, a dif-
·ferent historical burden, German political leaders have taken an active interest in 
counteracting radical-right tendencies, especial_ly fn the schools. The· Berlin SPD 
devoted a full day of discussion tc the relation between youth unemployment, limited 
historical knowledge of the Holocaust ·and anti_-democratic tendencies among. those 
_ under 18 (TAGESSPIEGEL, 2. July 1982). 
Anyone familiar with the West German music scene ·is likely to have trouble di-
gesting the findings of Shel] without a substantial dose of Morton's product, how-· 
ever. The punks, bikers, rockabillys, the heavy metal and new wave groups echo a 
very different refrain: 11you never· get bored when you I re frightened. 11 At the Punk I s 
version of "the Met!' -- Berl in 1 s Metropol -- the less empty beer cans thrown at per-
formers, the ·more appreciated the II sound" is judged t_o be. Texts are brutal and- con-
tain strong fascist overtones, especially among the New German Wave. But these are 
not Nazis in the traditional sense. As one concert promoter stressed, 11 they look 
like Hitler Youth, they are Hitler Youth, only they don't know who Hitler was. 11 . 
Moreover, "the record companies go along without skruples; as long as they can-make 
good money 11 · (DIE-ZElT, 16. July 1982). The shift in musical taste involves another 
ironic, nationalist twist. After three decades of domination by the·American rock-
market, _new wave bands are out to reject "foreign" music, helping Gennan recording 
finns out of the recession in the process. Researchers_ at the Heidelberg Sinus-In-
stitut take the musical metaphors seriously, having conducted -a:-survey in which 40 
. percent of the 14-18 year olds would 11 tolerate 11 the neo-nazis (DIE NEUE, 9-. J~ly. 
1982). . . . 
- As a: recrui bnent "source and battleground,. the schoo 1 s are also important to · 
the neo-nazi party, the NP0. A 11 citizen initfative11 calling itself Aktion .A.uslHnder 
-Stopp has appeared before the ~lorthrhein.:.westphalen Constitutional Court far its ' 
efforts to impose the principle of 11 native language instructio·n 11 in grade· schools. 
Limited access to German higher education and professions would presumably increase 
guestworkers 1 wi11ingness to return home. Heading the drive is an engineering pro-
fessor from Hagen, a known NPD ward leader (DIE ZEIT, 28. May 1982). Fifteen other 
university professors have signed. the .Heidelberg Manifesto of 17. June 1981, pro-
testing the "infiltration of the German folk by fore-igners, 11 espe"Cially Turkish re-
sidents unwilling to assimilate (DIE ZEIT, 12. February 1982). In contrast to Brit-
a in, organized nee-nationalist potential. in Germany seems to be stronger among 
older, more established strata. · 
The Federal Center for Political ·Education -recently· published a free brochure, 
projecting that the departure of 4,629,800 foreign workers would· open up 1.9 mil-
lion jobs. It then demonstrated that most of the Germans,_curre_ntly unemployed would 
be unqualified, i.e. for work in the mines, construction and automobile industries 
(TAGESSPEIGEL, 2. July 1982). The guestworkers and their children have maintained a 
low profile during the periods of urban unrest, although the problems of youth un-
employment and substandard housing affect them most directly.· Berl in-Kreuzber9 has 
becorr.e a 11 Little lstanbul 11 of 80,000; already one fourth o.f Berlin 1_s school-aged 
children are of Tufkish parentage. Although the weTcom~ mat wa~ rolled up five years 
ago, less than 4 percent of these families are now interested in returning to the 
homeland (T.A.GESSPIEGEL, 28. July 1982). 
The low profile has not prevented .the rise .of antipathy towards these especially 
hard-to-assimilate aliens. The Godesberg Institute for Applied Social Sciences found 
-that 49 percent-of the FRG· citizens are hostile towards the foreign presence, 22 
percent are ambivalent. Those who admitted to~prejudice tended to have no direct 
contact, yet considered th ems elves 11we 11 enough i nformed 11 about the guestworkers 1 
plight. Antipathy increased in relation to the age of those interviewed; it corre-
lated negatively with higher levels of education, however. The majority of respon-
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dents under 20, most likely to experience competition for scarce jobs, were 11 friend-
ly11 in their orientations, 65 percent •Of those expressing hostility were retired in-
dividuals •. Among academics, 28 percent were sooner negative:; of those with only grade 
schco 1 educations, 60 percent were disposed toward hos tin ty. Meanwhi1 e, the state 
government in Stuttgart has purchased 1000 Deutschland-Ober;..Alles record albums for 
distribution in Baden-Wurttemberg schools, and a 197,g Bavarian Law requires all 
would-be teachers to learn the entire text of the national hymn by heart (Oltmanns, 
p • 80) 8 • • C 
Both Great Britain and the Federal Republic are saddled with unique, albeit 
different historical burdens in regartl to ethnic minorities. Both.countries evinced 
a strong sense of national identity up until World War II (problems with the Scots, 
Welsh, Irish and maybe Bavarians notwithstanding). Neither hesitated to open its. 
door,s to a 1 i en. workers in the face of serious labor shortages. Accardi ng to one MP, 
11 the Mother Country welcomed them when there was work tc be done," recruiting citi-
zens from Barbados for the London Transport and Asian nurses for the National Health 
Service in the 1950 1s. German recruitment of Turkish, Jugoslavian and Italian workers 
for heavy industry was delayed a. decade, by the imperatives of reconstruction. One 
must b,ear in mind, however, that the "melting pot 11 is an American invention, not a 
European tradition; historically, the dQminant propensity for decades was to close 
national borders, not to integrate. 
· · The effects of economic recession, combined with the day-to-day exposure to 
alien cu1tures in one's ·own land are causing adolescents to ask what it means to be 
"British 11 or "Deutsch," if only indirectly. Class-based frictions remain strong in 
Britain, and very gloomy economic prospects giverise to a more aggressive identity 
search. The concept of 11 neutro-nationa1isms'1 used in conjunction with the German 
peace movement, the relative leveling of class differences after the war and in- . 
creased access to higher education after 196.5 could conceivably Jead to a more posi-
tive orientation among the young: as vanguards of the European peace movement, being 
11 German 11 may not be all that bad if one wants to identify c.t all. Table IV explores 
pre-peace movement trends: 
Table IV:. National Pride (In Percent) 
Question: Are you proud to be German/British/French? 
Age Country Very Proud Asha!lied Don't r:o : Number 
Proud ~are Response 
Total FRG 16 37 2 44 l 100 1006 
Sample GB 25 44 1 26 2 100 904 
Fr. 10 33 l 52 3 100 940 
12~13 FRG 19 41 1 37 2 100 333 
years . GB . 29 45 1 23 2 100 308 
Fr. 12 33 1 50 4 100 332 · 
17-18 FRG 14 37 3 45 1 100 332 
years GB 24 46 l 27 2 100 307 
Fr. 12 30 0 55 3 100 342 
22-·23 FRG 16 32 3 48 100 341 
· years GB 27 43 0 29 100 289 
Fr. 6 38 l 52 3 100 2€6 
Source: Jugendwerk der Deutschen She11; JUGEND Ill EUP.OPA, Band I!, 1977. p. 83. 
III. STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS: WHO'S PROTESTING HOW?· 
The initial phases of the European student movement in the mid-1960's bear lit-
tle strategic resemblance to the radicalized leftist protests of the late 1970 1 s. 
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For the most part, students adopted the non-violent tactics of the American civil 
rights movements: Marches, sit-ins, teach-ins and boycotts. Following .the death of 
Benno Ohnesorge during a 1967 .anti-Shah demo and the 1968 assassination attempt 
against Rudi Dutschke in Ber1in, the movement resorted to more militant tactics; but 
violence was directed expressly.against property, not against persons. The intensity 
'of the anti-Vietnam protests staged by a very fragmented Left, coupled with the rise 
of Baader.:.Meinhof-style terrorism, eliminated this distinction by 1972 (Mushaben, 
1980). The terrorist segment actually commands very limit_ed support; a larger group, 
i.e. peace-movement activists, reject violent tactics altogether. The r·emainder share 
an implicit acceptance of more militant forms of protest, including force against in-
dividuals, when other tactics have failed. It.is a passi.ve acceptance: the v_iolence 
against people is a reaction to acts of physical force used by the state itself 
against prates ters .. 
Protest strategies of the eighties derive from two decades of organizational 
experience~ The new.activism has no singletactical preference; rather, it depends 
on a curious mixture of long marches through the institutions, extraparl iamentary 
opposition and acts of 11 civil war" (Burgerkrieg) against the state. 
A. Dimension 11 Radicalization 11 and the Criminalization of Dissent 
In tenns of socialization experiences affected by politi.cal-economi.c condi-
tions, individuals born during the 1950 1 s and 1960 1s, and those who were raised dur-
ing the war and reconstruction years. are 1 iterq1ly worlds apart. The under-35 gen-
erations have· never experienced rfght-wing dictatorships first hand. They see the 
division of the world into capitalist and socialist spheres of influence as a fact 
of political ·life. Youth's image of the 11 free-democratic basic orderw includes 
. Berufsverbot, legislated limitations on· free speech and assembly, textbook censor-
ship in the schools, l::ureauc"ratic penetration of the private sphere and physical 
blows meted out by the long arm of _the law (Oltmanns, p. 69).· .· · 
The "sins of youth 11 committed during the seventies and .eighties result in .crim-
inal· r·ecords and life-long career consequences, once _the physical wounds have healed. 
The sins of earlier genera ti ans have been curiously overl coked: former SS-offi cer 
in the Ukraine, Rudolf Weber-Lortsch is a justice on the Federal Admtnistrativ~ 
Court; SS-volunteer Helmut Fuchs became president of the Mannheim Administrativ~ 
Court in 1978. Ministerpresident of Baden Wurttemberg Hans Filbinger, infamous for 
his campaign against 11 young Communists 11 in his home state,· was finally· forced. to· 
resign after his record as a Nazi-marine judge was uncovered. Former NSD.AP-:-member. 
Karl Carstens currently- sits as President of. the Federal Republic; over 1000. Nazi. 
judges returned to the bench after the war (01 tmanns, pp. 75,..77). . 
The number of arrests and.the extent of physical injuries accompanying pro-
tests, for which Table V provides examples, find no parallels in the sixties or 
e:arly seventies. 
Location 
Brixton 
Frankfurt 
Nuremberg 
Southall 
Zur1c:h 
Table V: Injuries and Arrests at Protest Events 
Nature of Protest 
Involved 
l House Occupations, 
Taken into 
Custody 
Convictions Injuries 
Forceful Evictions l death, 
Oec:ember 12, 1980 109 18 200 demonstrators _______________________________ . __________________________ 70_police ___ _ 
September, 1981 - 36 Pending lOL pol ice; number 
. of demonstrators not 
· · , :-eveal ed 
eee=o•--•-•oo••c ___ __, ___ oa--••~-••a••=•~-~e~---~•-•-oa~•~-------••---•--
Total 1979-82 1600 5791 trials 
Anti-Reagan Dernonstra-
ti~n, June 11, 1982 
"Race" 
April 10-12, 1981 
lj Startbahn-West 
Oc:tober-i:over.:ber, 1981 
I I Kor.m-Youth Center 
°11a'rc:h 5. 1981 
, Asians/NF 
11 Race 11 
April 23, 1979 
Autonomous Youth 
Center (1980) 
281 
247 
severa 1. 
hundred 
165/141 
345 
1746 
pending unknown 
pending 
unavailable 
unava i1 ab 1 e 
66 pending 
136 
680 pending 
240 demonstrators 
87 police 
4l: kncwn 
demonstrators 
401 police 
186 
none serious 
1 deat/1, 
93 Known 
demonstrators 
97 police 
3 known to r.ave 
lost an eye. 
Other figures 
unavailable. 
ources; gures are comp1 ed rrom press reports ano swr.mar1P.s rem wor s c1teo 
in this paper. 
In light of the mass turnouts at.protest demonstrations, from thousands to hun-
dreds of thousands, the num~er of arrests alone is not particularly signiftcant. 
Shocking, however, are the calls ra~sed by public officials -- whose task it is to 
keep the peace -- for a major build-up of police weapons to be employed against dem-
onstrators. From May 30 to September 12, 1980, Zurich police used 2,263 tear-gas 
pellets for pistols, 1,699 tear-gas grenades, 94 refi 11 s for tear-gas 11 1 aunchers," 
60 liters of tear-gas solution for high pressure hoses, 189 cans of tear-gas spray, 
and 1,650 loadings of rubberbullets, at 35 shots a loading (Haller, p. 57). Police 
at the occupied site of the proposeo Frankfu.rt airport runway have 11 experimerted'.1 · 
with a variety of crowd-controlling instruments, including: CN gas (outlawed in 44 · 
countries by the Geneva Accords of 1925), · in the form of chemical mace, gas pistols, 
grenades and "pepper fog generators; 11 ·high pressure water hoses with CN solution; 
blinding 11 shock grenades; 11 new wooden clubs, 1.2 meters long; plus 600 canisters of 
11 regular 11 tear-gas and riot gear (Himmelheber, 1982, pp. 87-88). Interior Minister 
Heinrich Luw.mer wants to outfit Berlin's police with rubber bullets and a nerve-gas 
solution, CS, for the city 1 s high pressure hoses (TAGESSCHAU, 28. July 1982) • 
. If the physical deterrents fa.il · to keep demonstrators off the streets, legal 
devices also came to the rescue of besieged politicians. Court proceedings against 
the 141 adolescents in Nuremberg have dragged an because of a 1977 anti-terrorist 
act preventing lawyers from representing more than one client -- not enough crimi-
nal defenders in Nuremberg! Squatters in Berlin have been -- illegally --_c·harged 
'Nith breach of peace against the state (Landesfriedensbruch) underJ125/ ~ 125a of 
the Criminal Code, instead of with trespass tHausfriedensbruch) underS1~3. Those 
with no prior convictions have been denied constitutional rights to "equal treat-
ment,11 e.g. to a suspended sentence under.§56 (Wesel in Kursbuch #65, p. 34ff). 
Inhabitants of co~munal apartments are indicted for 11 founding a criminal organiza-
tion,11.§129. Demonstrators carrying lemons to protect against tear-gas or wearing 
masks are arrested for "intentions to engage in violent behavior." The AJZ distur-
bances in Zurich have also ge~erated a tichtening uo of the Criminal Code (~259, 
~ ~ 
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§265StGB), denials of habeas corpus and limitations on the right to demonstrate_ 
(Schneider, 1982). As Swiss psychotherapist Paul Parin claims, "In the Federal Re-
public, officials.behave as if they would like to preve~t the rise of mer~ terrorists; 
in Zurich, they behaveas.were it their aim to produce terrorists 11 (Interview July 20, 
1982). Youth responds~ 11 Without the police, no riots!~ · · 
Radicalization among protesters is ·the direct result of the cri~inalization ~f 
dissent. Criminalization occurs in stages: 1) first those who disagree with estab-
lished policies and decisions are denied access to conventional poli~ical channels 
(e.g. referenda); 2) dissenters receive negative, often consciously inaccurate media cov-
erage; 3) demonstrators are subject to provocation by pol ice-ln-civilian clothes at :ral-
1 ies·, put under constant observation, etc.;_ 4) pol ice attired as wal ki.ng arsenals pro-
voke fear that leads to threatened ~se of fo~c~ or panic~ which ends in cotinterforce; 
5) participants are labeled and written off as chaotics, communists and criminals.-· 
These stages surrunarize, in a nutshel 1, the chronology of events, the mobilization of 
over 220,0b0 "average _citizens 11 protesting the removal of 3_00,000 trees for the con-
struction of Frankfurt 1 s Startbahn West (Himmelheber, 1981; Karasek, 1981) .. -
The youth scene is particularly sensitive and .quick to react to hardline tactics 
and_ever harsher sentencing by the state. ~epressive measures by the state escalate 
the willingness among demonstrators to engage in acts of violence. When politicians• 
themselves violate the rules of the game, more citizens respond with lega1-illegal-
scheissega1. _ Findings of an Infra test study on protest potential in the FRG might 
serve as a warning to decision makers, as.-seen in Table VI. . 
Table VI: Protest_0rientations - Infratest (In Percent), 
Item ~ General Teachers / Left Teachers Students! Students I Unemployed · Ur.r:mployed 
opulaticn Total \with protest Tota 1 With Left , with Postsecondary, without Post-
I potential 6~r~~f~t1 i matriculation i secq;,df;{ rr.a tr · ru a -1 n 
"In every democratic I -I . I , I ' society-there are cer- I -r~ ! ; ta i r, cohfl i cts which -
must be resolved ' I ' 
through the use of force" I I 
I I Disa9ree·: ! 65 83 ! 54 66 55 n 64 - _ 77 55 
"Every citizen has the ; I -
I . 
i i I I 
, 
right if .necessary to pro'- I .. - ! ,, 
tect her/his convictions , I ' 
; 
out on the streets•· I 
j 83 Agree: I 64 84 I 100 86 93 I 92 90 100 ' 
"A citizen -loses her/his I 
right to strike and to. 1-
demonstrate, whens/he 
i endangers the public order• 
Disagree 18 41 83 46 74 - 48 77 . 28 60 
-Source: Infra test W1 rtschaftsforschung, (Hrsg.). POLITISCHER PR0T~ST HI DER BUNDERSREPU6LIK DEUTSCHLAND, Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1980. pp, 84-85. 
B. Dimension 11 Decentra l i za ti on 11 in -the Peace and' Eco 1 ogy Movements . 
. . 
Campa;'gns against materialism may have been morally uplifting· during the sixties, 
but they rarely served to mobilize Herr and Frau Milller of the Silent Majority as 
much as the Anti-Nuclear Energy (AKK) Moverr.ent has.One of the most valuable lessons 
gleaned in. the struggles at Wyhl and Brokdorf was that smaller, locally based groups 
could mobilize more demonstratofs, fast~r. Decentralization lent itself to a focui on 
practical politics; at the same time, it became an antidote to bureaucratic aliena-
tion and generated alternative- sources of information. The 11 actions• in :_opposition to 
Startbahn West alone have ·engaged the energies of over 66 local 11 citizen initiatives• 
(Burgerinitiativen=BI) and·regional ecological groups (Ut_,WJELT EXPRESS, February, 1982). 
Nuclear,power has become the European metaphor for the destructive force of un-
bridled technology and unrestricted corporate growth. It simultaneously invokes the 
images of Hiroshima, the China Syndrome, Big-Science and Big Business in collusion 
with Big Government and, ultimately, Third World deprivation in favor of arms pro-· 
liferation. Where nuc1ear fervor may have serviced as a "surrogate for nationa1ism 11 
in the 1950 1 s (Ne1kin and Po11ack, 1981), nuclear opposition has become a stimulus 
for i nternati.ona li sm in the 1980 1 s. · 
What the AKK groups, the peace activists, the "spont1s" and.the squitters ·all -
have in common is their Betroffenheit, a feeling of being immediately affected by 
environmental destruction. They attest to a1ogica1 connection between the dangers 
involved in civilian as \-1el1 as in military uses of nuclear technology, whereas 
Leftists of the sixties tended to su~port civilian applications in opposition to m11·1-
tary nuclear development (Otto, 1977 • The nuclear question has subsequently split 
the. labor mpvement. Bath the Gennan 0GB and the British TUC -joined the anti-atomic 
marchers in the late 1950 1s (Helm, 1982; Duff, 1971). The fear that thousands of jobs 
are ·at stake ·has found segments of both forging coalitions with pro-nuclear forces in 
the 1980's. · · 
_ The peace movement has a 25 year tradition, which began with the "Struggle 
Ag~inst Atomic Death Campaign'' 1956-1958 and the first CND sponsored Easter March of 
1959. The British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament favored the long march through 
the nation as a prelude to a long march through the institutions via the Labor Party. 
Germans were less hopeful of an SPO electoral victory, and thus based their lessons 
on the direct action strategies of the British Committee of 100 (Pestalozzi·, 1982, · 
p. 28). · . 
No longer a NATO weakling~ the Federal Republic enjpys a focal position among 
peace activists.The Cold \•Jar question, posed for so long, "What will we do when the 
Russians come? 11 has been refonnulated: "What will we do if the Americans stay?" The 
movement has hit the FRG in two waves. The Evangelical Church Symposium of June, 1981, 
drew 120,000 to Hamburg to discuss Fear in a Nuclear Age; that wave culminated in the 
non-violent Bonn demonstration of 300,00D on October 10, 1981. The Reagan pronounce-
m·ent in late October, 1981, regarding the conceivability. of a (winnable) limited 
nuc1ear war provided additional impetus to the movement. The second wave culminated 
in the anti-Reagan demonstrations of June 10, 1982 in Bonn and Berlin. 
· The mobilization of hundreds of thousands owes directly to the proliferation of 
grass roots groups. Successful 11 actions 11 are manifoid: the number of German applica-
tions for conscientious objector status rose from 3,000 in the 1960's to 55,000 in 
1981; several hundred "peace weeks" and workshops on "nonvio1ent action 11 have been 
locally planned and executed; Green and Alternative Parties with Peace Manifestos of 
their own have scored el ectora 1 successes. Mora 1 support stems from para 11 el demon-
strations in neighboring countries, including the German Democratic Republi~ (Buscher, 
ettl., 1981). Rallies drew400,000 in Amsterdam in November, 50,000 in Bern in Decem-
ber, 1981, and 200,000 in Paris, June, 1982. Over 2 million people have signed the 
"Krefe l der App ea 1 , 11 · ca 11 ing for a· European peace referendum. Pub 1 i c figures such as 
Erhard Eppler and Rudolf Bahra add saliency to information meetings. Over 300 dis-
annament-related proposals were submitted at the 1982 SPO convention in Munich, after 
the SPO conducted its own Peace Forum in Bonn on August 27, 1981. A 1together there 
are over 2,300 local, national and international initiatives and institutions serving 
peace activists in Europe (listed in Pesta1ozzi, pp. 344-376). All organizers stress 
their contacts and cooperation with protest-groups in the US as evidence that the 
campaign is not an exercise in Anti-Americanism. 
The numbers ii.valved dictate a strategy of settling for the lowest common de-
nominator: the single shared objective is to prevent the 1983 stationing of Pershing 
-II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, as required by the NATO Double Decision 
of December 12, 1979. Their common conviction is that Theater Nuclear Forces will 
render Europe a prime target, that Germany wi11 become Ground Zero in a confrontation 
between the super-powers. The object is tc place the home governments ur:der as much 
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pressure as possible, insofar as: pro-disarmament forces are denied direct access to 
NATO decision makers. 
The tactical questions are unresolved. Contradictory opinions exist with respect 
to preferences for unilateral or multilateral disarmament ~greements; debates are 
waged over thedefinition of parity and the logical limits of deterrence. Activists 
are divided river whether or not to demand simultaneous reductions in.the Eastern bloc, 
and how_to deal with nucl,ear proliferation in the Third Wor-ld. No clear answer emerges 
to the question whether the build-up of conv~ntional forces is a morally acceptable 
proposition. There is no single position on the feasibility of a European nuclear-
free zone, on prospects for alternative defense concepts, or regarding the i nevi tabi 1-
ity of a political-bloc strategy. · ·· 
Activists have therefore made a conscious effort to avoid a party-political o'r-· 
ganizational modus, which could mean an end to the mass base. Party-political stances 
within the peace movement are still too preponderant (Pestalozzi, p. 95). For.this 
reason-, groups have rotated responsibility for the coordination of major events. 
Action Reconciliation/Peace Services orchestrated the 11 10.10.81 11 rally in Bonn, while 
the Berlin Initiative for Peace, International Balance and Security has sponsored 
other eve·nts. 
The notion that this is a movement 11made in Moscow 11 is undermined by the degree 
of church support it attracts, particularly in the FRG. ,Arrangements for the June, 
1982 anti-Reagan demonstrations fell largely to·the Evangelical Student Community. 
Church support is thus far limi✓ted to local parish initiatives in Britain, despite 
the 1982 formation of a Christian CND section -"." in addition to a Green-CND wing --
at the national 1evel. The Church of England' has agreed to add 11 peace 11 to its General 
Synod agenda in February, 1983. · · · · 
• As the· primary peace organization in the UK, the CNO is supported by_the European 
Nuclear. Disarmament Corr:mittee, founded in April, 1980. With a national membership that 
has grown from 3,000 to 36,000 between January, 1980 a1nd June, 1981, the CND relies 
on the efforts of 1000 locals, encompassing a quarter of a ~ill ion sympathizers. 
Even the peace movement in Switzerland is growing, slowly but steadily. Organi-
zers attribute the delay to the tradition of Swiss 11 neutrality, 11 to the emphasis on 
conventional defense and, in part, to the direct-democracy orientation. European 
disarmament is not subject to the outcome of referenda at the Cantonal level. Decen-
tralized decision-making has nonetheless benefited the anti.-nuclear energy campaign 
(Aubert, 1981). Swiss l.'Jusos 1.1 are spearheading a drive to· introduce alternative mi 1 i-
tary service -- the only other country in the Western ·continental camp besides Turkey 
without a C.O. option. · ·· 
An estimated ·OM 2. 2 bill ion wil 1 go to create the necessary infrastructure for 
the NATO deployments, the Gennan share amounting to OM 10 million: This• has added a 
new element to the, campaign against ·startbahn-West, because of the obvious conriection 
between the Frankfurt airport and Rhein:'""Main Air Force Base; as Foreign Minister · 
Genscher openly admitted this year (STERN, 18. February 1982; Himmelheber, pp. 7-9; 
Hechler, 1981, pp. 165-174). Thus, another link has been forged between- the peace and 
ecology movements. · · · 
The emphasis on decentralization has proved organ.iiati_onally effective. The large 
number of initiatives involved conveys the impression. of a unified political front. 
In reality, however, activists will have difficulty finding a new set of cornmori ob-
jectives, once the· deployment deadline has. passed in 1983. (especially if all goes ac-
cording to NAT0 1 s plan). Decentralization is nonetheless significant·for ideo1ogic:al 
reasons as well. Both-anti-nuclear drives have instilled in hundreds o~ thousands 
a different understanding of the role of participation in democratic society. 
C. Oirr.ension 11 Institutionalization 11 - From Alternative to Initiative to Party 
For the leftists of the late sixties, the Long March and the Extraparliamentary 
Opposition (APO) were not exactly mutually exclusive propositions. In Germany, the 
SPD remained the clear favorite throughout the Grand Coalition 1966 - 1969, and the 
Social Democrats were helped into power by the newly enfranchised voters they had 
actively recruited. Brandt's extensive platform of social refonns in 1969 1ed leftists 
to believe that the SPD could be used as a vehicle for cracking open formerly elite 
instituti•:>ns, such as universities. They took seriously Brandt's exhortation to 11 dare 
more democracy. II . . 
By the 1980's, European social democratic parties -- along with their more con-
servative competitors -- seem to expend more energy distancing themselves from their 
own radical youth factions than they do cultivating new recruits. Primary examples 
are the SPD Ju sos and the Labo·ur Party I s Militant Tendency ( LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES 
28. June 1982). SPD Bundesgeschaftsfuhrer Peter Glatz sumr.-:arizes tr.e problem: ''The 
Party awakened false hopes that parties could change lives and alter the relation-·· 
ships among human beings'1 (Oltmanns, p. 114). For Germany, Glatz and others now pic-
ture a society divided into 11 two cultures" -- the political establishment and the 
"alternative scene. 11 • 
\·iho er what is "alternative" has consequently become the new 64 mil 1 ion 0-Mark 
question, as political scientist and Netzwerk cofounder Joseph Huber points out. 
The 11a 1terna tive 11 spectrum encompasses a plethora of "peop1 e, milieus, motives and 
o~1nions" (r.uter, 1981, p. 9). Among the organized groups, a few are radicalized, 
some are nationalized, many are depoliticized and all are decentralized and decidedly 
post-mat~rialistic. Those who continue to engage in politi~s locat~ along an ideologi-
cal spectrum·stretching from left-wing social democratic, ~to radical democratic to 
anti-parliamentarian. 
Alternative groups concern themselves i,.iith everything from religious sects to 
therapy groups, from agricultural life-styles to urban v1elfare services, from civil 
liberties to Third World initiatives. Huber estimates that there are over 11,500 proj-
ects in the FRG, involving 80,000 activists. If all sympathizers are taken into ac-
count, the figure falls between 300,000-400,000. The breakdown of project types holds 
12 percent devoted to "production," 70 percent to "services" and 18 percent pursuing 
"political work," 29. percent entail handwork; 71 percent of the projects call for 
mental labor (Huber, pp. 28~30). · ' · 
The second culture appears to consist of three strata, with three strategic 
orientations. Neither the Long March nor the APO strategy has been complete1y aban-
doned by the politically disillusioned of the eighties. Their strategic repertoire 
has in a way been expanded by the addition of the "drop-out11 option. The last cate-
gory is not limited to the squatter scene. There are a1so those in Wohngemeinschaften, 
who buy their Mus1i and bread in alternative shops, patronize cooperative bookstores, 
read only newspapers from leftist presses, baby-sit in anti-authoritarian day-care 
centers,•work in small self-organized businesses, view old Bogart movies in "off-
cinemas," and are ultimately proud of the fact that they have had no contact with 
"the outside" for\several years ·(Fichter and Lonnendoncker, in Richter, 1979) .. 
One question which provokes di~sension among many groups is ~hether or not to 
accept state subsidies for alternative projects;some fear cooptation, others are ad-
mant in their rejection of the system as. a whole. Netzwerk Se1bsthi1fe. has provided 
one alternative source of capital for .projects, based on sympathizers' voluntary con-
tributions. As Hans Maier from Wissenschaftzentrum/IMM Berlin pointed out, this ~tra-
turn of drop-outs may in fact be the most consistently po1itica1 of the three, insofar 
as the 1ife-style itself reflects a radical concept of po1itical-economy. The work 
i~ small, self-organized undertakings rests on a belief that democratic decision-
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m~king can only occur in the presence of decentralized-economic relations. The . 
Netzwerk system enhances their economic significance, but also runs the risk of turn-
ing the alternatives into a secondary, integrated "free market system·~ .. 
- ' ' ti ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
Citizen action groups, the Burgerin-itiativen, constitute a reincarnated.-extra---
parl iamentary opposition to the established party system. At the same time, they also 
- fit the "institutional"_ image in the lobby or pressure group tradition. As the first 
initiatives organized during the late 1960's,: they were viewed as political action 
.committees appended to the SPD. Their extraparliamentary engagement in the -environ-
mental field was expected to complement party platform efforts.By the mid-1970's, 
the BI's had become an autohomouir force, indeed a source-·of direct opposition. The· 
anti-Startbahn·initiatives will likely catapult the:SPD from power in Hess·en,come· 
the September 1982 elections (Schiller-Dickhut, et _tl., · 1981). · · - - -
II . -
There are an estimated -38,000 Burgerinitiativen in .Germany, backed by at. least _ 
15·mi1lion sympathizers~ Membership figures.outstrip those of the established ·parties, 
· and the model has been emulated by citizens th·rougliout Western Europe. The unifying 
factor is the Ecology Movement, coordinated through a nati.onal roof organization, the 
Federation of Citizen Initiatives· for Environmental Protection (BBU-) ~ ·over the decade, 
thi BI's have deVeloped a more sjstematic·political tritique direcied against Onre~ 
stric_ted economic growth and the des·truction of the environment via technology -- a -
theme shared-with the-peace movement. BI membership shows a substantial 9verlap·with 
the original APO and Long March generation. Participants share an. upp·er-middle class 
·background, are highlyeducated, well-fnfor-med, and self-:confident with respect to· 
their own political skills~ _ - · · · · · 
Resurrected political causes·,- self-confidence and acquired·organ-izational skills 
are being rechanneled into the political establishme_nt through the Green; Ecology and 
Alternative Parties, that hava taken root in S~ede~, Britain, Fr.Snee, Italy, as well 
as in the Federal Republic. The relative strength of these parties is in part a func_-
tion of the respective electoral system·. The proporz principle>in Switzerland, has 
maintained a stable, four-party coalition since December, 1959, driving ecologists 
back into these parties (Aubert, p. 223ff). The winner-take-all tradition in Britain, 
already under .fire from the new SOP, leaves little room for parliamentary activity 
by the nascent Ecology Party there. The combined proportional represent_ation and 
list systems in the FRG have· unlocked the ·doors to-new parties, but the 11 5 percent 
clause" has ~revented the Greens from crossing th~ thresh6ld at the national level. 
Substantial progress has nonetheless been made; alternative parties have attained 
legislative seats in Berlin (May, 1981)~ Bremen (October 1979),' Hamburg. (June 1978) 
and in the CDU-stronghold of Baden.;.Wurttem~erg (March 1980)_. Continentally, the 
Greens even garnered 3.2 percent in the first direct elections to the European Parlia-
~ent (June 1979). · 
The Green .and Alternative List (Al-) Parties are tied to other protest groups by 
virtue of their common emphasis on autonomy, direct participation, solidarity, envi-
onmental compatibility; transparency ·of decision-making and variety (Raschke, 1982). 
Diversity is reflected in the fact that there are free-greens, red-greens, brown-
greens, . black-greens and multi co 1 ored-greens, though members have tried to avoid· -
$plits along ideological lines by proclaiming th1iy_move 11 neither left nor right but 
forwards" (Raschke, p. 325). Moderates f~voring depoliticization. distance themselves 
from the communist groups, the relics of. 11 yester:lear. 11 Radicals seeking repoliticiza:-
tion have now created another party, the Democra ;ic Soc.ialists -- a mirror image of 
the SOP/Labour Party split -- through the efforts of Martin Coppik (TAGESZEITUNG, 
18. June 1982). Disparate positions on tactical radicalization and the role of vie- -
lence have also produced.confusion among the ranks. The Alternative List - Berlin 
offered an extreme example this summer, as it literally crawled out from under the 
· debris of a violent, illegal anti-Reagan demon~.tration and the subsequent firebomb-
ing of its hea-dquarters .(TP.,GESSPIEGEL, TAGESZE~TUMG, 10-15 June 1982). 
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The regionally based AL/Green Parties are the unique product of two decades 
of protest ~xperience. They constitute an Extraparliamentary Opposition-Within-
Parliament.- Outside the legislative assembly, they work actively with the BI 1 s. In-
side parliament, they view their participation• as a vehicle of support for the extra-
parliamentary movements (Schi11er-Dickhut, pp. 147-149). Decision-making rests on 
the consensus·principle; debate in the 1oca1 and plenary assemblies 
(Mitgliedervol1versamm1unaen) continues until a· common position emerges. Whether the 
Alternatives/Greens prove institutionilly effective in the long run will depend on 
whether or not they are able to reconcile their own direct-democratic procedures · 
with the imperatives of the parliamentary process. A conscious non-decision in the 
absence of consensus has little effect if the parliamentary majority refuses to wait 
until one-evolves. Further, the larger the parttes grow, the harder it will be to 
adhere to 11 fundamentally-Elemocratic 11 dec·ision-,procedures. Michels 1 spectre of oli-
garchy lurks in the political wings. 
_ The.Alternative Parties_ enjoy substantial support among otherwise: apolitical 
youth. The 19$1 Shell study reveals that, following the 32 percent ,,.,ho identify with 
no party~ 20 percent back the Greens, as opposed-to 24 percent for the SPD and 18 
percent for the CDU/CSU (Jugeridwerk, 1981, p. 674) ., Green sympathizers evince higher 
levels of unemployment and are more pessimistic about the future than established 
party supporters. Twenty percent is not bad for a party founded in 1979/80. It sig-
nifies an i dent.ifi cation too new to have been conveyed through traditi cna 1 parenta 1 
channels. Curiously enough, the British SOP has also picked up young supporters by 
virtue of its image as an 11 a 1 ternative 11 to the major parties. More importantly, that 
support has risen from 6.3 percent in 1980 to 24.6 percent in 1982 -- among white_ 
working class youth who also sympathize with the National Front and British Movement! 
(Cochrane and Billig, 1982). The Alternative Movement, and the parties mobilizing 
behind it, may be the only agent still capable of catching young rebels and offering 
them a degree of social integration and Lebenssinn (01tmanns, p. 275). The No Future 
generation might otheNise become a se·i f-fu lfi 11 i ng prophecy. 
. \' lJ. 
A. 
PROTEST 'AND THE METAMORPHOSIS OF EUROPEAtJ DEMOCRACIES-
The Parties·,· the People and the Defl;ocra tic Process 
Protest potential in \~estern Europe has increased, as has extremist potential 
(Infratest, 1980}. Protest is on the rise, as Suzanne Berger notes, because of a 
11 faile::! connect'ion 11 betw€.:en the estab1ished parties, on the·one hand, and. the re-
qui si tr:s of the ·new pol i-ti cs, on the other (Berger, 1979). Perhaps the two most fun-
damenta1 questfons facing .democratic systems today are 1) to what extent can this 
growing protest potential be integrated into the existing political system; 2) to 
what extent is _the state wi11ing to integrate a variety of protest-generated 
i niti a.ti ves? 
Past-Materialist values, ~.g. the eMphasis on self-actualization and greater 
individual·autonomy, have:already effected changes in citizen attitudes toward par-
ticipation and protest. If 1·1odell-Deutsch12nd offers any insights as .to future 
trends; ho1;1ever, the politic~leadersh·ir can r2st assured that 1eftist protest .po-
t~ntfoi "is id:::ologically str11 firmly bound to th-2 democratic system 11 (rnfratest, 
1980, p. 106). The change in o~~ientations. toward dernocr,1.cy rests with a greater ac-
ceptance-: of non-conventional •forms of participation; the ~le'I Politics differs 1•/ith 
iespect to means, not ends. ·This· grmving acceptance is a European-vlide pher.ornenc,n, 
1s Tables VII and VIII illustrate: 
Tab 1 e V!i: _ Acceptance _of Unconventional · 
Forms of-Participation in the Federal Republic-
Unconventiuna 1 
Participation 
Seale * Persons -who express support for un~ 
Valu~ - ·conventional forms and who would 
be prepared· to engage in such under 
certair. .conditions N=4008 
Participation in a petition 1 90.9% 
drive 
Participation in a "Citizen 2 - 85.7% 
-Initiative" 
Joining in a licensed politi- . 3 58.0~ 
cal- 'demonstration 
Participation in a Boycott 4 30.1% 
Withholding of Rent, Interest 5 18.8% 
or.Taxes 
Blocking traffic with a 6 13.4% 
demons tra cion 
Participation in a wildcat 7 8.3% 
strike 
Taking over/occupying factor~ 8 5.5% 
. fes, offices, public buildings 
Destruction of private property 9 1.3% 
Use of physicai force 10 0.6% 
against persons 
*Items with a scalP. value 4-6 classified as Political Activism . 
. Items witll a scale value 7-!0 coded by lnfratest as Protest Potential .. 
Source: Infra test \lirtschaf:57:;:-:;:h•11"S ~,..b. H. POLIT!SCHER CROTEST IN DER 
BUNDESREPUBLIK" DEUTSCHLAND, S t~,tsart: Koh 1 harrmer, i9oG, p; 49. 
Table VIII: ·orientation to Political Behavior 
and Acceptable Fon::s·of Participation (In Percent) 
_ . (1976) 
Country Apo1itica1 ~~; xsd Only On1y 
Cr-!'lven:~ O!iU.; U:-iccr.~,·en: i a r:a 1 
Federal Republic 27 33 13. 27 
Fil\1ilnd 25 35 :t9 21 
Great Britain• 30 33 · 15 22 
Italy 24 34 7 35 
Netherlands 18 39 11 32 
Au~tria 35 27 19 19 
Switzerland 24 37 15 24 
USA 12 50 - 18 · 20 
.Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
ioo 
100 
. Source: Max Kaase,- "Partizioatorische Revolution-Ende der l'arteien?" in 
Joachim Raschke (Hrsg.) -BORGER UIIO PARTEIEN, 0pladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982, 184. · · - . . . 
Max Kaase finds a positive corre1ation between the scales for conventional and 
unconventional types of political behavior. He-interprets this as a.sign that non-
conventional participatory forms expand the citizens• political .repertoire, thus 
allowing for more flexible involvement in the decision-making process (Kaase, p. 
183). The data also make clear 11 that the established actors in-the political process, 
above all the political parti~s, no longer have the chance to exercise a monopolistic 
claim over involvement in the political consen·sus-building and decisicn-making pro-
cess11 (Kaase, p. 184). They are unlikely to relinquish this ·monopoly with style and 
grace, however. 
The 11 intellectual head-movement 11 of the late 1960 1 s which has found a home in 
protest· campaigns for peace arid environmental protection perhaps unwittingly -- is 
pursuing a path outlined by t'arcuse over a decade ago. They have learned that politi-
cal powerbrokers and whole systems 
cannot be pushed aside, they must be combatted on their own grounds. This 
means that, from the beginning, the personal and particular liberation, 
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refusa 1 , withdrawal , mus.t proceed within the pol i ti ca 1 context, defined by the 
situation in which the radical opposition finds itself, and must continue, 
in the theory and practice, the radical critique of the estab1ishment within 
the Establishment (Marcuse, 1972t p. 49)". 
The dua 1 strategy adopted by the A 1 terna ti ve and Green parties, a 1ong with the 
extensive use of petitions and referenda, etc. indicate that protesters are willing 
to have their causes integrated into the system; to what degree is still uncertain. 
Through the vehicles of· protest, initiatives and alternative projects, activists 
have discovered, however, that the majoritarian parties are unwilling to rework their 
ideologies, programs and decisional structures. Increasingly it is the Catch-All par-
ties themselves that are recognized as "insurmountable obstacles to the satisfaction 
of important social needs ••. in fact they limit9 constrain and undermine 11 (Berger, 
p. 40). Established parties have undertaken a common effort to prevent voter losses 
which stand to benefit the Alternatives and Greens. These efforts have ranged from 
ridicule ("romantic ideal ists 11 ) to scare tactics ( 11 a Green vote is a lost vote -
the CDU will come to power 11 ), to outright denunciation and criminalization (Genscher/ 
FOP: 11 coalition of growth-rejectors 11 TAGESSPIEGEL, 6. July 1982; Stoiber/GOU: "same 
rhetorical methods as the Nazis" TAGESSPIEGEL, 25. July 1982). 
If new actors, pol icy preferences and values cannot be integrated into tradi-
tional political institutions -- this in the face of an ever~expandir:lg state -- then 
"the great missed opportunity of the last decade" may actually eliminate the estab-
lished parties sooner than the protest groups themselves. The Greens may yet do to 
the SPD what Franz Josef Strauss failed to accomplish in the late seventies -- in 
the spirit of David stalking Goliath. 
8. 11 Scmethi ng 01 d 2nd Something Ne\'1 11 - From the 01 d Left to the Nevi Left to the 
Ncnlef t 
After this "lengthy march through the European protest landscape, I will only 
attempt to highlight a few of the differences observed along the way from the sixties 
to the eighties. 
Protesters of the 1960 1 s campaigned for radical system transformation. Their 
frustrations, anger and critiques were directed against the performance failures of 
the capitalist system in the past. The Long March strategy they adopted reflected a 
degree of trust in the-state's ability to master crises and to accommodate social 
change, however. The econol'f'lic and technological developments of the last decade have 
intensified the desire as well as the need for radical changes in the political 
system. 
'But the willingness to engage in the process of system transformation is de-
clining rapidly among the younger c1ass of today 1 s protesters, at the same tirneit 
is growing among those old enough to have witnessed or participated in the eariier 
movements. The depression, alienation and anger of youth protesters in the 1980 1 s 
concentrates on their perceived 1ack of future prospects. These rebels tru~t neither 
the Left. nor the Right, nor are they directly interested in overthrowing the state. 
They want to be 1eft alone, to choose their own life-styles. They scoff at 11 the 1 68-
grandpas who still haven't registered that we aren't fighting for the public, but 
for us!" (Kursbuch, p. 15). 
The Ne•"'· Left rejected the Old Left at the end of the sixties for_ its tradi-
tional commitment to hierarchy and vanguardisrn. The Soviet bureaucratic monolith 
no better suited the New Left's utccian image than did -the rat race of competitive 
capitalism. The Nonleft of the eight~es rejects ~he New Left and the old APO as 
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e1 ements of an i ntell ectua 1 "head movement, ii which indeed they wereo The APO. of . 
1968 directed its charges against, but also addressed itse1f to the established in-' 
stitutions. The 11 class of -1 68 11 was told that its language was incomprehensible (it· 
was). The degree to which students have lost prominence in the new movements is. best. 
i11.ustrated by the fact that 11 the carr,pus of Berlin 1 s Free University nowadays re-
sembles the aband_oned parking lot of an office bui1ding. on weekends" (01tmanns, p~89). 
. . 
The punks,rockers, rostas and squatters are alleged to have no language at all. 
But they speak the visceral languag~ of Ancst, to which politicians dare give little 
expression. 11 We· have ·enough reasons -to cry without your tear-gas 11 .;. and their fear has 
a rational and active core; The Angst is not over growing old; rather, it relates 
to the.serious problems facing society as a whole~ such as nucle·ar proliferation, 
environmental destruction and structur.al unemployment. Paradoxically, support among 
the young for the peace and ecology_movements is great, but their active participa-
tion is limited. Their initial politicai experiences have been n·egative and physical. 
The unifying factor among the protest movements is no longer an overarching ide-
ology, but the substantive conr:iections·that participants are discovering as each move-
ment evolves. The repressive character of capitalism~ se has been downplayed; it 
is not only the corporations, but large-scale organizations in general that have been· 
rejected in favor of. communal, self-help projects and groups. The activists of the 
eighties are much less naive about accepting .further ·technological development as the · 
solution to fundamenfal social problems. The emphasis is placed on human dignity, ·sen-
sitivity and solidarity. · 
Learning experi~nces for the.over-30 activists have been bf-a more p6sitiv~,-or-
ganizational character. Through the BI 1 s, they seek Jo draw political decision-making 
back ihto those spheres, down_ to those levels where they can hope to exercise collec-
tive influence. This group rejects preprogrammed political decisions,which politicians 
try to legitimiz_e on the.basis of technical or budgetary imperatives •. They are sti.11 
de.'Tian~ing ~hat the system ·dare more democracy. · · 
. . . . 
·_ Not exactly .a 11 '68-Grandma 11 ,myself, I passed my 30th birthday amidst the anti-
Reagan activists in Berlin, observing the generation gap first hand, as former APO's 
with_ baby carriages, groups of guestworkers and even church leaders lined up to demon-
strate 70,000-80,000 strong with students, punks and squatters. In search of Verstehen 
(and in need of some moral support as I sprang the 30 threshold), I returned to Marcuse 
for an explanation of what was happening 11 then 11 - only to discover that the Essay en 
Liberation mirrors niore closely the protest events Of· 11 now: 11 •. , . • . · , 
The militants have invalidated the concept of 11 utopia 11 - t·hey have denounced 
a vicious ideology. No matter whether their action was a revolt or an abortive 
revolution, if is a turning point. In proclaiming the 11 p~rman~nt chfllenge
11
:·· 
the 11 permanent educat1on, 11 the Great Refusal, they recognize tne marK of social 
repression, even in the most sublime manifestations: of traditional culture,. 
even in the most spectacular manifestations of technical progress. They have 
again raised a spectre (and this time a spectre which haunts not only the_ 
boutgeoisie but all exploitative bureauc~acies): the spectre of a revolution 
which subordinates the development of productive forces jnd higher stan~ards 
of living to the requirements of creating solidarity for the human. species 
(Marcuse, 1969, p. ix). · · -
That ~pectre is indeed haunting Western Europe. 
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